This article proposes a new measure of civil war. The measure de…nes violence intensity in casualties per capita instead of number of casualties. We discuss the assumptions behind this per capita model and the existing standard model. We show that the two measures behave di¤erently in standard growth regressions and argue that this is because the standard model is a mis-speci…cation in this context. Casualties appear to a¤ect growth more in smaller populations. We argue that a debate on the right model can help distinguish between competing theories in the con ‡ict literature. This is particularly relevant given the current development of new micro-data in this …eld.
Introduction
The empirical study of civil war has recently experienced a boom. An important tool for this research has been data on con ‡ict victims both on the national level and, more recently, at the sub-national level. Typically, empirical work uses the absolute number of victims or con ‡ict events to distinguish between di¤erent intensities of violence. 1 The UCDP/PRIO Armed Con ‡ict Dataset, for example, uses two thresholds of 25 and 1000 battle related deaths to de…ne dummy variables which have been used extensively in the cross-country literature. Even when other data is used, the 1000 death threshold is an important element of the way civil wars are de…ned.
Countries di¤er signi…cantly in their population size. The 1000 (and 25) casualties threshold is therefore applied to units of observation that are extremely heterogenous. Figure 1 illustrates one consequence of this de…nition. The …gure shows the relationship between population size and the prevalence of civil war, as de…ned by the 1000 casualties threshold. 2 The higher is population, the higher is the likelihood of experiencing a civil war. This raises the concern that the combination of heterogenous units and absolute threshold is the "wrong" model to study the e¤ects and causes of civil war. An insurgency, for example, could have very di¤erent e¤ects on the number of casualties in populous and less populous countries. If one uses the absolute threshold to study insurgencies this could a¤ect results.
This article discusses the theoretical assumptions behind two ways of coding civil wars: a violence measure that uses absolute numbers (the standard model) and a measure in per capita terms (the per capita model). We show that the two measures imply very di¤erent assumptions regarding the relationship between violence and the respective independent or dependant variables. In studies of the e¤ects of war, the e¤ect of violence needs to grow proportionally with population to justify the use of the standard model. In other words, there must be a public bad aspect to violence. The standard model also assumes that triggers of violence a¤ect individual behavior less in larger countries. This is conceptually questionable if, for example, the independent variable is de…ned in per capita terms or as a national average.
To illustrate the potential impact of this model choice we study the e¤ect of civil war on GDP 1 See, for example, Besley per capita growth. We show that de…ning civil wars with the number of battle-related deaths in this context could be an error. If we interpret the correlations in the cross-country data as causal, the economies of large, populous countries are less a¤ected by a death than the economy of a small country. When we analyze the economic impact of civil wars on growth, the relative measure produces estimates that are up to 40 percent larger than in the standard model.
This should not be seen as an argument that the per capita model is the "right" model in all
cases. Instead, we argue that theory should provide the fundament for empirical work. There is a conceptual weak spot that is generated by the use of the standard model as a default. The danger is that new insights from micro studies will not speak to this literature.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 discusses some of the related literature to show that the issue of scale is largely sidestepped. The following section discusses the theoretical underpinnings of the standard and the per capita model. In Section 4 we argue that the impact of civil war on per capita GDP growth is captured much more accurately by the per capita model. Section 5 discusses the …ndings and draws conclusions for the con ‡ict literature.
Related Literature
The measurement and de…nition of civil war has always been a contentious issue. 3 However, there is a large implicit consensus regarding the use of absolute numbers as a measure for intensity in the empirical literature. The theory behind using absolute numbers is rarely made explicit.
We start our discussion with the cross-country literature. Cerra and Saxena (2008) analyze the growth e¤ect of civil wars in the cross country data. interesting possibility that di¤erent models should be used at di¤erent levels of aggregation. It is, for example, completely consistent that violence is public bad locally but that the e¤ect dissipates 4 The Copenhagen Consensus project and the World Bank, for example, rely heavily on estimates from the cross-country literature like Collier (1999) . so that at the aggregate level it is not. The standard model should then be used at the micro level and the per-capita model at the aggregate level.
The Per-Capital Model of Violence
Consider two ways of using violence data available in a panel dataset. The …rst is to use the absolute value of victims of violence. The data could be used to construct a dummy or used as a count. Our argument is valid in both cases but for expositional purposes we focus on the case in which the count is used. De…ne the variable W ct as the number of deaths in geographic area c at time t;
We will call this the standard model of the intensity of civil war. It is used in most empirical studies of violence, mostly in shape of a dummy that attributes civil wars to country/year observations that cross a threshold in the count of deaths.
As an alternative, we suggest the number of deaths weighted by population in area c at time
We will call this the per capita model.
The literature on the impact of violence has set per capita (economic) outcomes, y ct , in a relationship to the absolute number of deaths
In the per capita model this equation is analogously
and in both of these models, the parameters and^ are assumed to be constant across c and t.
The marginal e¤ect of a death on per capita outcomes is therefore
in the standard model, and
in the per capita model.
From equation (3) we can see that in the standard model the marginal e¤ect of a death on production per capita is assumed to be constant across time and units. Most relevant here is the assumption that the e¤ect of an additional casualty is independent from the population in c. In other words, violence is treated as a public bad so that the impact of violence is independent of the size of the population. In the per capita model displayed in equation (4) Similar arguments apply to civil war as a dependant variable. In the standard model the individual likelihood to engage in violence needs to be inversely related to population. In other words, the standard model is realistic if per capita con ‡ict e¤ort is decreasing in population. It could be, for example, that con ‡ict is centralized and can therefore be modelled by one aggregate contest function. The free-rider problem within groups will then reduce per capita e¤ort in larger
populations. The standard model should also be used if the correct unit of observation is the government or the state rather than the country. A putsch could, for example, lead to violence levels that are independent of the size of the country. In the per capita model this decision is independent of population. If con ‡ict is decentralized and triggered by local characteristics then the per capita model needs to be used.
It is important to note that the di¤erence between the models is not restricted to the country level. Units c could as well be grid cells or sub-national political regions like districts or states.
These units can therefore feature similar di¤erences in population to the country level and, hence, imply similar problems.
Economic Growth and the Per Capita Model
In this section we turn towards contrasting the two measures in the previous section empirically.
We do so by studying the growth e¤ect of civil war in the cross-country data. Cross-country data of civil wars is important as it forms the backbone to most of the micro studies and has been used extensively in studies not concerned with the e¤ect of violence directly. In addition, the cross-country data has served as an important pillar for policy work.
A good way to re ‡ect on the e¤ect of violence on growth is the productivity parameter A in AK model. Assume that per capita output in country c in year t, y ct , is given by
where k ct is the per capita stock of capital. It follows
and per capita output growth is therefore given by
so that a persistent reduction in A ct has two e¤ects. First, growth drops immediately because the existing capital stock has become less productive (reduction of We test these two theories empirically. In the standard model we focus on the threshold of 1000 battle-related deaths and use the count of casualties as a robustness check. 5 To ensure 5 Many studies use the low threshold of 25 battle-related deaths either as the main speci…cation or as a robustness check. As smaller events remain largely unreported this threshold captures the extensive margin of political violence which will be identical in the standard and per capita model.
comparability between the two models we construct the per capita measure as close as possible to the standard measure of 1000 battle-related deaths. To do this we …rst divide the PRIO count of battle-related deaths by the population of the country. We try both average population and current population in this step in order to be able to check robustness in this regard. We then construct a dummy that uses an intensity threshold such that the number of civil war years is equal to the number of civil war years in the standard model. In this way we make sure that di¤erences in the results are not due to one event being more or less common than the other.
We match the resulting dummies with GDP per capita data from the Penn World Tables. This gives us data from 1950 to 2011 and from 187 countries. For a detailed discussion of the sources and data see the appendix. Table 1 provides summary statistics. By construction, the means of the per capita measure match that of the standard measure. In other words, we exchanged some country/years above the 1000 casualty threshold with others below the threshold. This moves about 100 country/year observations below (and 100 above) the threshold. This is about 20 percent of all observations of civil war.
Using the model and the constructed civil war dummies we run standard growth regressions of the form
where g ct is per capita GDP growth, W ct is the respective measure of civil war, c are country …xed e¤ects and t are year …xed e¤ects.
The parameter of interest is . We expect this to be negative if violence hinders economic activity. Changes in the estimated from the standard to the per capita model will be due to the selection of country/years which qualify as "treatment". In the standard model captures the impact of a war with more than 1000 battle-related deaths on growth. In the per-capita model captures the e¤ect of a civil war with an intensity of more than 0.065 battle related deaths per capita. 6 The results from estimating equation (5) are in Table 2 . In column (1) we use the civil war dummy from the standard model. If we interpret the coe¢ cient in Table 2 as causal, a civil war year as de…ned by the 1000 deaths threshold reduces growth by about 2.8 percentage points.
In the previous section we argued that the validity of the standard model depends on whether the reaction of per capita growth to one death is constant across countries with di¤erent population. In column (2) we divide the civil war dummy by population in order to check whether civil war a¤ects growth di¤erently depending on the size of the population. 7 The coe¢ cient on the resulting variable reveals considerable heterogeneity of the e¤ects of civil wars depending on population. Growth in more populous countries reacts less to a con ‡ict that exceeds 1000 battlerelated casualties. In fact, heterogeneity is so large that the standard measure is insigni…cant now. In column (3) we then run the same analysis with the count of battle-related deaths instead of the dummy. Again, the measure of casualties per capita enters with a negative sign which indicates that the economies of more populous countries are less a¤ected by casualties.
Columns (1) to (3) suggest that the standard model is the wrong model when analyzing growth. Growth seems to be a¤ected less by casualties in populous countries. This …ndings motivates the use of the per capita model. In column (4) we run the same speci…cation as in column (1) only now we replace the absolute measure by our per capita measure. A civil war year now reduces growth by 3.5 percentage points. This is a striking di¤erence given that we only redrew the line of what quali…es as a civil war but did not change the total number of civil war observations. Column (4) uses the current population to calculate violence intensities. The fact that there is almost no change in the coe¢ cient indicates that it is the general scale of countries and not smaller variations of population that determine the di¤erence to column (1).
In Table 2 we …nd that the switch to the per capita model increased the size of the estimated coe¢ cient in equation (5) by more than 20 percent. In Table ( 3) we run some robustness checks regarding this increase. In columns (1) and (2) we use only data after 1989. Estimates in the standard and in the per capita model increase. The point estimate in the per capita model is now more than 40 percent higher. In columns (3) and (4) we restrict the sample to countries below the mean income. The per capita estimate is about 30 percent higher now.
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 3 restrict the sample to countries with an average population of less than 10 million. As expected, the impact of civil war in the standard model increases compared to the main estimate in column (1) of Table ( 2). At the same time the di¤erence to the per capita model disappears -both models now suggest a similar growth impact of over -4.5 percent. This highlights the fact that the heterogeneity in population in the sample is what really drives a wedge between the per capita and standard model. When this heterogeneity is 7 We use average population to avoid that time variation in population drives results.
restricted, the two models yield similar results. 
where W i;ct are now a set of dummies that capture deciles of violence intensity in the two models.
In the standard model we group all country/years according the number of battle-related deaths such that W 1;ct captures the 10 percent of violent country/years with the lowest number of battlerelated deaths. In the per capita model we group all country/years according to the number of battle-related deaths per population.
In Figure 2 we show the estimated i coe¢ cients in the standard model, i.e. with growing intensity deciles. At an intensity of 6 the negative growth impact of violence becomes signi…cant.
However, this is reversed at an intensity of i = 9. We have^ 9 >^ 8 and cannot reject the hypothesis that^ 9 = 0. There is a now a much clearer negative trend after an intensity of 4 with coe¢ cients becoming signi…cant at i = 6 and no reversal at i = 9.
By and large, the standard model appears to be the wrong model when trying to explain per capita growth. This does, of course, not mean that the standard model is not valid in other applications. But the results in this section put into question its universal validity.
Discussion
There is a broad consensus in the con ‡ict literature regarding the use of counts of casualties or violence events as the measure of con ‡ict intensity. We have argued that with regional units that are heterogenous in population the use of absolute counts imposes a particular model which should be made explicit and, perhaps, questioned. We suggest an alternative model that we call the per capita model. In this model casualties are weighted by population to give a measure of violence risk.
We have contrasted the two models by running standard cross-country growth regressions in both of them. The per capita model appears to capture intensity of con ‡ict better in this context. We have shown that intensity in the standard model leads to growth e¤ects that are non-monotonic in intensity. This can be explained by the fact that very populous countries, is correctly used then it must be a mechanism that is valid at the state level, not at a more disaggregate level. Income shocks then trigger violence because they lead to a government crisisnot because they lower the opportunity cost to violence. This interpretation would be in line with
Bazzi and Blattmann (2011) who suggest that the mechanism that links commodity price shocks and civil wars might be operating through the fragility of the state. If this is true then economic shocks lead to violence because they weaken the state and it is correct to use the standard model.
While these conjectures are highly speculative they illustrate the main point of this article.
The empirical literature on the causes and consequences of civil war needs to put its foot down regarding the mechanisms behind its empirical speci…cations. As a rule of thumb, state-centred theories should use the standard model while economic/opportunity cost channels should use the per capita model. The fact that the opportunity cost channel and the state fragility channel operate at di¤erent scales could be used to tell them apart empirically.
The current surge in disaggregated data makes these issues even more important. In most cases it will be theoretically inconsistent to use the standard model at di¤erent levels of aggregation. If the standard model is valid at the micro level, then more micro units will produce more violence which makes the standard model invalid at the country level. A theory-driven approach is needed to link country and micro …ndings.
Section V, in their paper studies the role of public and private rents for con ‡ict. 8 According to their theory, per capita con ‡ict should increase when a high degree of publicness in the nature of the con ‡ict coincides with high ethnic polarization. The results here are particularly interesting as the interaction between ethnic composition and economic incentives provides richer time variation. Table A1 , column (1) reproduces the speci…cation from Table 9 column (1) 
B Data Sources
In our study of growth we try to build a panel of as many countries as possible that reaches as far back as possible. We use data on battle-related deaths by Lacina and Gleditsch (2005) between 1946 and 1989. This data is complemented by the compatible UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset v.5-2013. In both of these datasets we used the "best" estimate where possible and the average between low and high when no "best" estimate was available. In order to be as consistent as possible with the casualties data we generate the absolute value dummies from the data of battle-related deaths.
Due to its large coverage of countries we merge this data with the Penn World Tables data version 7.1 from Heston et al (2012) . We use real per capita GDP data (rgdpl) and calculate growth as the percentage point increase of per capita GDP compared to the previous year. is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the number of battledeaths exceeds 1000. "Civil war (per capita model)" is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the number of battle-related deaths per population exceeds a threshold. The threshold is chosen such that there are exactly as many civil wars in the sample as in the standard model. Columns (2)-(4) use average population, column (5) uses current population. in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. "Civil war (standard model)" is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the number of battledeaths exceeds 1000. "Civil war (per capita model)" is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the number of battle-related deaths per population exceeds a threshold. The threshold is chosen such that there are as many civil wars in the sample as in the standard model. Columns (1) and (2) use only data after 1989. Columns (3) and (4) use only data from countries with a GDP per capita below the mean. Columns (5) and (6) use only countries with an average population of less than 10 million. Table 9 of Esteban, Mayoral and Ray (2012). Column (4) omits population as control variable. The figure shows coefficients of a regression of GDP per capita growth on 10 intensity decile dummies, country and year fixed effects. Dotted lines indicate 95 percent robust confidence intervals.
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Intensity deciles: casualties per capita The figure shows coefficients of a regression of GDP per capita growth on 10 intensity decile dummies, country and year fixed effects. Dotted lines indicate 95 percent robust confidence intervals. The figure shows coefficients of a regression of GDP per capita growth on 10 intensity decile dummies, country and year fixed effects. Dotted lines indicate 95 percent robust confidence intervals.
